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Advances in neuroscience and pharmacology have led to improvements in the cognitive
performance of people with neurological disease and other forms of cognitive decline.
These same methods may also afford cognitive enhancement in people of otherwise
normal cognitive abilities. “Cosmetic”, or supranormal, cognitive enhancement offers
opportunities to enrich our social or financial status, our interactions with others, and
the common wealth of our community. It is common to focus on the potential benefits of
cognitive enhancement, while being less than clear about the possible drawbacks. Here
I examine the harms or side-effects associated with a range of cognitive enhancement
interventions. I propose a taxonomy of harms in cognitive enhancement, with harms
classified as (neuro)biological, ethical, or societal. Biological harms are those that directly
affect the person’s biological functioning, such as when a drug affects a person’s mood
or autonomic function. Ethical harms are those that touch on issues such as fairness
and cheating, or on erosion of autonomy and coercion. Societal harms are harms that
affect whole populations, and which are normally the province of governments, such as
the use of enhancement in military contexts. This taxonomy of harms will help to focus
the debate around the use and regulation of cognitive enhancement. In particular it will
help to clarify the appropriate network of stakeholders who should take an interest in
each potential harm, and in minimizing the impact of these harms.
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INTRODUCTION
Practical ethical decisions about cognitive enhancement require an analysis of the potential benefits
and the potential harms of any drug or technology. But ‘‘harm’’ rarely means the same thing
in different contexts or when used by different people. So there is a need for greater clarity in
debates where potential harms and potential benefits are being balanced. Here I will outline one
possible way to organize our thinking around the harms of cognitive enhancement, with the aims
of clarifying the types of harms that may be encountered, and of understanding which groups may
take an interest in each type of harm.
In this review article I propose that the harms that we encounter in cognitive enhancement fall
into three categories:
I. (Neuro)biological harms
II. Ethical harms
III. Societal harms.
I will examine each of these categories, and show how a framework such as this helps
in guiding thinking about the desirability of particular routes to cognitive enhancement.
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Although not intended as a hierarchy or scale of seriousness,
these harms are roughly grouped in order of their directness, or
immediacy from application of the enhancer.
To focus the discussion, this review article will only consider
pharmacological enhancers and device-based enhancements.
What does this focus exclude? Primarily it excludes lifestyle-
based enhancement techniques such as getting plenty of sleep,
avoiding recreational drugs and alcohol, and having a healthy
diet and getting plenty of exercise. It excludes paying attention
in school and reading for pleasure. These are proven, efficacious
techniques that are not usually ethically troubling. It also
excludes cognitive training and training via neurofeedback,
which are techniques of uncertain efficacy and do not have
the quasi-invasive nature of drug- or device-based techniques
(Maslen et al., 2014).
Pharmacological methods involve the ingestion of pills or
potions that cross the blood-brain barrier to affect the activity of
the brain. Different drugs affect the brain in different ways. For
example, the common putative enhancing drug methylphenidate
(Ritalin) works to increase levels of dopamine in the brain
by increasing dopamine availability through an effect on its
receptors (Volkow et al., 2001). By contrast, mood-enhancing
drugs such as Prozac act by slowing the rate at which the
neurotransmitter serotonin is re-absorbed by nerve cells, so
making more serotonin available in the circuits that control
positive mood (Nutt et al., 1999).
Several qualitatively different types of cognitive enhancement
device are available. Devices that use externally-applied electrical
or magnetic energy to alter the excitability of brain function
have been in use in neuroscience labs and clinics for some
decades. Of these, much interest surrounds transcranial electrical
stimulation (tES), and particularly the form that uses direct
current (tDCS), since the devices are already appearing on the
consumer market (Maslen et al., 2014; Wexler, 2015), and are
relatively cheap and easy to manufacture at home (Fitz and
Reiner, 2015). Neuroscientists frequently refer to transcranial
magnetic or electrical stimulation as ‘‘non-invasive brain
stimulation’’ or NIBS (Davis and van Koningsbruggen, 2013).
Deep-brain stimulation (DBS) involves surgical implantation
of electrodes into a target brain structure to deliver electrical
pulses that enhance or disrupt neural transmission. The
impracticality of access to DBS means that it is beyond the
scope of this discussion, but it is worth noting that the
ability of DBS to target deep neural structures and pathways
that underlie reward and motivational behavior make it a
technique for possible future concern (Synofzik and Schlaepfer,
2008).
THE NEED FOR A TAXONOMY OF HARMS
The notion of harm in cognitive enhancement is rarely dealt
with in any detail. Neuroscientific publications may discuss the
potential direct, physical harm that a person may experience
from the enhancer or procedure, such as the risk of seizure,
but usually framed in the context of criteria that exclude groups
of people from a lab-based experiment. At the other extreme,
ethical discussions of cognitive enhancement may propose a
hypothetical, side-effect free enhancer, the use of which addresses
a philosophical question of fairness or obligation, such as
whether a surgeon has a duty to take a pill that keeps her alert.
It is rare to find a discussion of specific harms that arise from
a specific technique, and which may concern a specific group of
people. Here I will attempt to give a framework for understanding
different forms of harm, and give specific examples of where
these harms may arise from procedures that are in common
use.
Taxonomising harms has two effects. First, we can see the
type of harm generated by a specific enhancer. Second, we can
identify the people or groups whose interests are affected by the
enhancer. For example, a drug that has no known side-effects
but which can be taken, undetected, to enhance performance in
an examination would be of interest to a philosopher studying
fairness, but would be of little interest to the medical community.
Or a device with potentially serious side-effects, but the ability to
enhance mind-reading during a military interrogation, may be a
matter for international treaties.
In the following sections I will deal with each of the three
classes of harms of this taxonomy. I will discuss some examples
of harms within each category, and I will summarize each class
with an indication of who are the stakeholders in any discussion
of those harms, and how discussions around these harms might
be shaped.
I. (NEURO)BIOLOGICAL HARMS
In this category are harms that arise directly from the enhancer
itself. Many of the harms in this category might normally
be called side-effects, although I also include here effects that
go beyond the ‘‘usual’’ list of side-effects that one commonly
encounters. Most, but not all, of these harms have their effect
on the brain or the central nervous system, but it would be
more accurate to describe these as harms to the biological
functioning of the person. Harms are listed here in terms of the
biological response, although many harms may have common
causes.
Seizure
A seizure is an abnormal synchronization of electrical activity
in the brain. Although many different factors may lead
to a seizure in brain tissue, it is of particular concern
in cognitive enhancement since pharmacological or device-
based enhancers often work by changing cortical excitability.
Artificial modulation of brain excitability is always treated with
caution in a professional setting. For example, most research
institutions exclude people from experiments with NIBS if
they show elevated risk factors for seizure, including family
history of epilepsy, or recent use of drugs or alcohol (Davis
et al., 2013). Seizure is a rare complication in professional
settings, with only a single seizure reported after tDCS (Ekici,
2015) and an estimated risk of less than 4% even in people
who already have epilepsy (Schrader et al., 2004). However
although the risk may be small for any individual person
or procedure, the incidence of serious adverse effects is
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likely to increase as the use of enhancers becomes more
widespread.
Mood Changes
Many modern uses of neurointervention involve treatments for
mood disorders. Applying tDCS across the prefrontal cortex
over several sessions has been shown to lift mood in non-
depressed and in depressed individuals (Brunoni et al., 2011b;
Austin et al., 2016). However the electrode positions used in
these studies (the F3/F4 positions of the International 10-10
system) are also used as targets in several studies of cognitive
and memory function. So the possibility exists that interventions
for enhancement of memory may lead to unintended changes
in mood.
Drug Interactions
When a drug such as methylphenidate is prescribed by a
physician to treat a deficit, it will usually be accompanied
by a list of other drugs that may or should not be taken
at the same time. For example, it may be recommended not
to drink alcohol or take sleeping pills. When enhancers are
taken outside of this controlled environment, such as for
cognitive enhancement, it is less clear how prescription or
controlled drugs may interact with the enhancer. Enhancers
may be taken at higher doses than usual or in combination
with stimulants that may risk autonomic complications, as is
already being seen on college campuses in the US (McCabe
et al., 2005). Much less is known about how NIBS may be
affected by other drugs. The long-lasting effects of NIBS seem
to rely on a range of neurotransmitters, including dopamine,
N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) and serotonin (Filmer et al.,
2014). For example, blocking NMDA receptors abolishes the
long-lasting benefits of stimulation (Nitsche et al., 2003), so
any psychoactive medication that operates via these mechanisms
will interact with any enhancer that also relies on these
same substrates. What could be harmful in not knowing
these interaction effects? First, a user who is not satisfied
with the effect of an enhancer (due to its being blocked
by another drug) may increase their dose of the enhancer,
placing them at greater risk of the side-effects of the enhancing
drug or device. Second, drugs and devices may interact with
each other in unknown ways, manifesting as effects on the
central nervous system, or on the other vital systems of
the body. As enhancers become more widely used, it will
be increasingly important to communicate these risks to at-home
users.
Skin Lesions
Applying energy across the scalp means a build-up of electrical
charge at the boundary between tissues of differing electrical
properties. This is the source of the effect of tDCS, where
modeling studies suggest that charge accumulates at the
boundary between the highly conductive cerebrospinal fluid
and the highly insulating gray matter of the cortex (e.g.,
Sadleir et al., 2010). However the boundary between the
electrode and the scalp is another area where charge may
accumulate, and this accumulation may be experienced by
the participant as a warm or hot sensation. Poorly applied
electrodes could burn the scalp, although in practice the
electrodes are readily removed so this rarely happens in
controlled settings (Brunoni et al., 2011a). Factors that seem to
increase the risk of skin reactions, including irritation, burns
or contact dermatitis, include long duration protocols with
high current, and the salinity of the solution used to soak
the electrodes (Bikson et al., 2016; Matsumoto and Ugawa,
2017). The long-term effects of chronic electrode use are not
known.
Addiction and Dependence
People may become dependent on stimuli that activate their
reward systems. For example, nicotine is a highly addictive
compound that appears to increase dopamine availability in
the midbrain (Rice and Cragg, 2004) so activating reward
pathways, and opiates such as heroin act directly on opiate-
mediated reward pathways (Koob, 1992). Could a person
become addicted to or dependent on cognitive enhancement?
Ritalin and Modafinil are not thought to be addictive in
their own right, and have even been suggested as a means
of enhancing treatment for addiction to other drugs (e.g.,
cocaine: Grabowski et al., 1997; Martínez-Raga et al., 2008).
Rats with electrodes implanted in midbrain reward structures
are known to show signs of addictive behavior such as
frequent self-administration at the expense of eating or drinking
(Koob, 1992), although the homologous brain areas in humans
would be accessible only to DBS and so are beyond this
discussion. However human addiction is a multi-component
process that includes many cortex-mediated functions such
as cue association, behavioral control and mood monitoring
(George and Koob, 2010). It would therefore seem possible
that a person could trigger addictive-cycle behavior as an
unintended consequence of manipulating involved functions.
For example, in one study tDCS of prefrontal cortex to
enhance memory (Berryhill and Jones, 2012) used the same
protocol as another study that lifted mood (Austin et al.,
2016); so one consequence of memory enhancement might
be an unintended association of the procedure with a
boost in happiness, setting up a reward cycle. There is
also the possibility that people may become dependent in
a less direct sense, through the development of a belief
that enhancement is necessary in maintaining their current
productivity or status; this point is developed later (shifting
norms, below).
Zero-Sum Trade-Offs
Scientific explorations of enhancement using NIBS typically
set out to discover if a particular method has an effect on
a particular faculty. It is regrettably rare for experimental
work to look for off-target effects (Davis et al., 2013). This
is despite two well-known features of brain stimulation: first
that the energy delivered to the brain during stimulation is
never isolated to the target region of the brain, and second that
no brain area concerns itself only with a single function. So
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the likelihood of adverse effects in a function other than the
one under scrutiny varies from possible in primary motor or
sensory areas to unavoidable in some highly-connected areas
such as the prefrontal cortex, as suggested above under mood
changes. Certainly the rare works that test for off-target effects
do show trade-offs such as enhanced learning at the cost of
automaticity and vice versa (Iuculano and Cohen Kadosh, 2013).
Some authors have gone as far as to suggest that such trade-
offs are an inevitable consequence of the function of the brain
(Brem et al., 2014), although the evidence for this position is
rather scant (Luber, 2014). The picture is complicated further
by the finding that even within a given protocol, individuals
respond very differently; even for stimulation of the primary
motor cortex, the ‘‘gold standard’’ of protocols, there is wide
variability in response (Wassermann, 2002;Wiethoff et al., 2014).
Other studies have shown paradoxical excitation with supposedly
inhibitory stimulation (Batsikadze et al., 2013), or qualitatively
different responses between younger and older participants
(Heise et al., 2014). These findings highlight the need to examine
individual differences, as well as presenting group results, in
understanding enhancement protocols.
Summary
In this section I have discussed some of the possible harms
that a person may experience as a direct result of taking an
enhancer. Harms could be clustered according to how the
enhancer creates the harmful effect: so changes in mood and
changes in seizure threshold both arise from the changes in
cortical excitability induced by the enhancer. Alternatively, one
could divide these harms into short-lived or long-lasting harms:
a skin lesion may last for hours or maybe a day or two, while
an alteration in emotional processing may last for months or
years (which is desirable, in the case of depression). However we
classify them, these harms might properly be called side-effects,
and are equivalent to the side-effects listed on the packaging
of pharmaceuticals. Determining the likely (neuro)biological
effect of an enhancer is the responsibility of the manufacturer
and of the person delivering the enhancer to another person.
So in a university laboratory the researcher may rely on the
manufacturer of an enhancing device to have adhered to proper
engineering standards, and must take responsibility for correct
application of the device to a participant and for following
accepted safety guidelines. It is also the researcher’s duty to
monitor for adverse effects of the enhancer, and to ensure
the comfort and safety of the participant at all times. In a
wider sense, it is the researcher’s responsibility to contribute
knowledge of these harms to the community through good
scientific practice, namely: conducting well-designed and well-
controlled experiments; reporting the results of all experiments,
including ones with null or ‘‘inconvenient’’ results; and reporting
any adverse effect resulting from the experiment.
II. ETHICAL HARMS
Ethical harms here are those which do not arise directly from
the specific enhancer, but rather from the covert or non-
reciprocal use of an enhancer, or from the use of an enhancer
in new contexts. Bioethical analysis almost invariably considers
interactions among a small number of people, where one
person may act unfairly towards another, or may seek to gain
an advantage within a group. The recent rise of cognitive
enhancement methods has generated much interest among
philosophers, as a novel angle on the longer debate around
enhancing physical capabilities.
Cheating
Covert use of an enhancer is always likely to be ethically
problematic, compared to open use. Many discussions of
pharmacological enhancement focus on the use of drugs such
as Modafinil on college campuses, where students may gain
(perceived) advantages in examinations or coursework through
the use of drugs designed to treat neurological conditions.
Covert use of enhancement in education is invariably taken to
be wrong in such discussions. Analogously, enhancement of
sporting performance (‘‘doping’’) may be perceived as allowable
or not according to one’s view of what is the goal of sport
(Savulescu et al., 2004). However one views enhancement in
sport, if the rules deem an intervention to be wrong, then using
the intervention is by definition cheating and covert use of the
intervention is particularly wrong. The seeming success of NIBS
in enhancing cognitive and motor performance in laboratory
settings means that it is inevitable that we should start to
see neurointerventions in sports (‘‘neurodoping’’: Davis, 2013).
However, just as in sports doping, the pressure to take enhancing
substances leads people to take potentially harmful substances in
order to keep up with their peers (Sjöqvist et al., 2008; Forlini
and Racine, 2009). In many cases this pressure may come from
a person’s organization, which raises questions about coercion
(Dryden, 2006).
Authenticity and Naturalness
A common worry about enhancement is that it diminishes
and devalues the authenticity of our achievements. Again the
model of drug enhancement in sport is instructive—we are
disappointed when we learn that an athlete has been stripped
of his medals after failing a drug test. Should we feel the same
when a person excels in an examination, but has done so having
taken Modafinil? And what should that person think about their
own achievement? It could be that an outcome achieved in the
context of enhancement is in some way less valuable than one
made without, as it has removed the person from their authentic
desires and abilities. A counter argument might be that if a
person truly has a desire to achieve the highest possible score
in a test and truly does not feel that enhancement is wrong,
then that achievement is authentic for the person. There is no
simple definition of authenticity, and debates on authenticity in
enhancement can reveal more about the debater’s preferences
for human flourishing than clarity on the acceptability of
the practice. Nevertheless there does seem to be some inertia
on the part of the public to accept cognitive enhancement
methods as described here, possibly resulting from the perceived
unnaturalness of the enhancer compared to methods such as
exercise and good sleep (Caviola and Faber, 2015). A possible
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 4 February 2017 | Volume 11 | Article 63
Davis A Taxonomy of Harms in Cognitive Enhancement
reason might be the view of Santoni de Sio et al. (2016)
that taking an exam after taking an enhancer means that the
person is effectively playing a different game—the ‘‘game’’ in
an exam is to test a person’s natural ability to retain and recall
information, so changing the way in which information is learned
makes the game into one of expanding capacity. Santoni de
Sio et al. (2016) distinguish between activities where the goal
is to produce a certain outcome (goal-oriented activities, such
as producing a rock album) and activities where the process
itself is tested (practice-oriented activities, such as marathon
running). Some work is required here to clarify issues around
praiseworthiness for enhanced acts, and to determine when one
person’s enhancement is beneficial or detrimental to the activity
as a whole.
Unequal Access
Justice, or equal treatment for all, is a core principle of bioethical
analysis. Is there a risk of unequal access to enhancers? At present
it is easy and cheap to buy putative enhancement drugs such
as Modafinil from the internet (Schepis et al., 2008), and tDCS
devices can be bought cheaply or evenmade at home for minimal
cost (Jwa, 2015). So there seems to be no particular barrier to
access to enhancers among people with access to the internet
and who have sufficient cash to invest in them. Naturally this
position favors themiddle classes, who have the resources and the
awareness to access enhancing products, but such disfavoring of
people on lower incomes is not unique to the sphere of cognitive
enhancement.
Enhancement in Children
Any ethical discussion is necessarily amplified when applied to
children. Most (but not all: Lebel et al., 2008) of the brain’s
development occurs during the period of life before the person
is considered to have responsible independance, yet is also the
time when educational assessment often sets up a child’s future
earning potential. There is therefore pressure amongst parents
and peers to use any fair means possible to perform better
in examinations, or to gather a portfolio of achievements in
extra-curricular activities. The particular ethical worries here are
around the ability of a child to make informed decisions about
her own cognitive enhancement, and about the reliability of our
knowledge of the effects of different enhancers on the child. In
the former situation many of the arguments are shared with
other biomedical procedures, where a child is required to assent
to a procedure, but only a legally responsible person such as
a parent can give consent. The latter situation reveals a gap in
our understanding of the effects of many enhancers, particularly
NIBS, and our inappropriate tendency to treat children as ‘‘small
adults’’ when setting dosage (Davis, 2014). The ethical pressure
in enhancing children is intensified when considering that any
effects of enhancement, good or ill, are likely to affect the brain’s
development for the rest of the child’s life, since the brain is in a
more plastic state during the early years (Lenn, 1991). Given this,
it is important that we consider carefully the arguments that may
be used to justify cognitive enhancement in children (Krutzinna,
2016).
Third-Party Risk and Responsibility
Much ethical analysis of cognitive enhancement focuses on the
immediate rightness or wrongness of enhancing a particular
action. However many actions also, at least potentially, involve
a wider group of people than those immediately involved
in the enhancement. It is clear that enhancing one person’s
performance in a school test may cost another person their place
in the ranking table. But the harms may extend beyond the test.
We saw above that tDCS has been shown to enhance learning,
but at the cost of automaticity (Iuculano and Cohen Kadosh,
2013). A recent study showed that tDCS could be used to aid
flight training in pilots (Choe et al., 2016), however an important
question remains whether the accelerated learning during the
tDCS-enhanced training phase may come at the cost of impaired
reactivity during real-world piloting. Given that commercial
airline pilots may be responsible for transporting several hundred
people at a time, it would be important to monitor the progress
of training-enhanced pilots if the technology proliferates.
Summary
The above examples of ethical harms reveal situations where
cognitive enhancement may threaten accepted practices, or
introduce sources of unfairness between people. Although there
are active theoretical discussions of the ethics of enhancement
(e.g., Savulescu and Bostrom, 2009), this section has looked at
the practical ethics of determining potential harms in individual
cases. Without a solid set of guiding principles for enhancement,
it is a matter for individual regulators to determine what is
fair or right, or how to incorporate enhancement into their
regulated practices. So the responsibility for examining the harms
lies with bodies that oversee the domain of interest. In the
educational setting it is likely that a school or university will
take a stand on the permissibility of using enhancers, and this
may be a matter for a federation of institutions to produce
collective guidelines. Where a third party may be harmed as a
result of a person’s enhancement, it may require clarification or
modification of the law. This process requires input from the
users of enhancement drugs or devices to understand their needs,
and from manufacturers and researchers who can advise on the
safety and capability of the enhancers. It would then be a matter
for the overseeing body to relate these needs and limitations to
the values of the activity, to produce guidelines for the use of
enhancers, and to monitor and enforce these guidelines.
III. SOCIETAL HARMS
The preceding section discussed how cognitive enhancement
may impinge on interactions between people, or on the rightness
of enhancing certain actions. However the widening access to
enhancers will make these ethical questions more prevalent and
more pressing. This means that we will need to address the
societal implications of widespread access to enhancement. It is
at this level that moral concerns become more pressing, where
‘‘morals’’ are taken to be the prevailing values or codes of conduct
of a particular society. While there is no particularly satisfactory
definition of moral conduct, nor an agreement about where
morals may come from, there is at least a sense that we know
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when an agent acts immorally. In this section I will consider
potential harms to society at large when cognitive enhancement
becomes more widespread or extends to areas where moral
conduct is crucial.
Shifting Norms
One possible outcome of limited use of cognitive enhancement
is that the restrictions upon their use become relaxed or
eroded, and the default state of society moves from one
where enhancement is exceptional to a state where to refuse
enhancement would be considered remarkable. There are two
ways in which the default, or norm, might shift. In the first case
there may be a perceived advantage in taking an enhancer, with
the advantage being sufficient to outweigh any possible harms.
In this case an ‘‘arms race’’ of overt or covert consumption
could develop where no individual wants to be left behind. In
the second case the norm drifts more passively, that is without
the pressure of competition, but with the caveat that once a
person starts using an enhancer it would be seen as perverse
to give it up. This pattern has already begun to emerge in the
context of academic cognitive enhancement (Forlini and Racine,
2009). These cases are not mutually exclusive: for example, the
use of ‘‘chalk’’ (magnesium carbonate) proliferated among rock
climbers during the 1980s as a way to dry sweat from the
fingertips. There were several prominent ethical objections to the
use of chalk, namely that it caused environmental damage, that
it made it easier for subsequent climbers to follow a line of white
chalk-marked holds on the rock, and that the use of chalk as an
enhancer devalued the achievement of a difficult ascent. Despite
these objections, the use of chalk spread both through its use in
competitive elite climbing and by hobbyist climbers, and is now
so common in most European and North American climbing
areas that it is easy to forget that there is little evidence that it
confers any real benefit (Li et al., 2001). Thus the use of chalk
may serve as a historical model for how the use of an enhancer
of minimal real benefit may spread within a community through
different mechanisms, until its use becomes the norm.
Respect for Human Variation
People vary in all aspects of their personhood. We differ in our
taste in music, in our haircuts and in our favorite childhood
cartoon character. However we also vary in how fast we can run,
in howmuchmoney we earn and how skilled we are at concealing
wrong behavior. All of these latter attributes are potential targets
for enhancement. While it may be desirable (at least to an
individual) to change their potential to learn information, we risk
a lack of respect for those who do not or cannot make the same
changes, and a lack of respect for the notion that the variation
among people is exactly what defines our individuality (Jordan,
1921). It is considered socially unpleasant when a person looks
down on another for having less money, and it is also unpleasant
(or, should be) when a person looks down on another for being
less intelligent. Widening access to cognitive enhancement will
make this social inequality more pressing for those who do not
enhance. Associated with respect for human variation is respect
for disability. Many conditions of disability are associated with
qualitative differences in brain structure, that make it practically
or absolutely impossible to raise cognitive capacities to even
to the average level of the unaffected population. Although
bioethicists would generally consider this to be treatment rather
than enhancement, and therefore relatively unproblematic (e.g.,
Schwartz, 2005), it reflects a dimension on which people may
vary, and where there may be pressure to change.
Military and Security Uses
The defense industry has a long-standing interest in human
enhancement, both for offensive and defensive purposes.
Amphetamines have a long history of use in the military, for
their ability to promote wakefulness and alertness during long
operations. The US Air Force has a programme that generates
enormously useful declassified information on the limits and
the safety of tDCS in particular (see the Air Force Research
Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base)1. The recent
rise of enhancement technologies has led to concerns about
their possible use in a military context. At heart is the erosion
of the moral responsibility of military personnel, who have a
duty to obey the accepted rules of military engagement. Moral
responsibility of personnel during warfare is a complex equation
involving many factors, including those of legal obligations and
of the duty to obey a superior’s orders. There has long been
concern that enhancers such as amphetamines may diminish the
capability and the responsibility of an agent during action (e.g.,
Bower and Phelan, 2003). Wolfendale (2008) discusses the moral
difficulties of technologies that dissociate an agent from his or her
actions, and the importance of centering moral responsibility on
the agent. Moral disengagement is a feature of a person’s ability
to commit heinous acts (Bandura, 1999), and many common
pharmaceutical enhancersmay affect a person’smoral judgement
(Crockett, 2014). The secret nature of military research means
that many of these potential societal harmsmay not come to light
until it is too late for the usual deliberative process of academic
thought to be more than a coroner’s inquest.
Obligations and Duties
To this point we have considered the use of an enhancer as a
voluntary decision, albeit one which may be more likely to be
made if societal norms shift. But could there be situations where
a person could be compelled to use an enhancer? For example,
could a surgeon be compelled to take a pill that would keep her
awake and alert for the duration of a long and complex surgery?
Goold andMaslen (2014) suggest, on grounds of legal pragmatics
and legal philosophy, that English law at least would not hold a
surgeon liable for refusing an enhancer. The strong presumption
of a person’s right to bodily integrity generally overrides the
perceived advantages of compulsory medication, and Goold and
Maslen (2014) note that the law treats negligence by omission less
seriously than negligence by commission. At present, at least, it
would seem that arguments of bodily integrity, or more precisely
mental or cognitive integrity (Bublitz, 2013), would supervene
over any attempt to enforce an obligation to enhance, and any
variation of this right would likely require transnational action.
1http://www.wpafb.af.mil/afrl/711hpw
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However there may be cultural obligations to enhance that are
less susceptible to legal oversight. For example, many workplaces
are notorious for the degree to which employees are expected to
work long hours or to conspicuously consume alcohol and other
drugs in the name of workplace bonding or client management
(Frone, 2003; Pidd et al., 2011). While regulators have made
some efforts to address many illegal or antisocial practices, it is
clear that junior employees feel significant pressure to conform to
the local norms, and that such a coercive atmosphere requires a
concerted, or possibly generational, change if it remains resistant
to the general societal view of enhancement.
Neurointerventions in the Criminal Legal
System
The criminal justice system relies on establishing the true
course of events, and on determining a level of punishment for
wrongdoing. This process is inevitably imperfect, but there is an
interest in methods that increase the reliability of judgements
and the appropriateness of punishment. So far the law has been
reluctant to use neuroscience as probative evidence, although
neuroscience may be introduced in many jurisdictions. One
controversial use of neuroscience is the possibility of uncovering
concealed knowledge, either through prompting a confession
from a suspect or from increasing the reliability of an eyewitness’s
memory (Moreno, 2009). These avenues suffer from the problem
that they add an additional layer of epistemological uncertainty
onto a process that is already inexact (Rakoff, 2008). There is
also the possibility that jurors and judges may be swayed by
the so-called ‘‘seductive allure’’ of neuroscientific methods and
imagery (Weisberg et al., 2008), although this worry may be
unfounded (Farah and Hook, 2013; Roskies et al., 2013). It seems
unlikely that neuroenhancement may be used in the near future
in establishing guilt or motivation in criminal law. However there
may be more use for enhancement in rehabilitating offenders.
For example, Cabrera and Elger (2016) discuss the possibility
of heightening or dampening the emotional component of
offenders’ memories as an aid to promoting remorse or
reducing the satisfaction gained from a crime. Alternatively the
antecedents of crime such as addiction (Fecteau et al., 2010)
or antisocial personality tendencies (Canavero, 2014) may be
susceptible to neuromodulation, although other ethical barriers
may intervene.
Summary
Societal harms are harms that threaten the stability of societies.
That is, they may threaten the stable values of a community,
or threaten the stability of interactions between nations. This
is not to say that societies are unable to absorb change. But
such change usually requires acts of government or debates
between nations. For example, the conduct of war is guided
by treaties that establish reasonable practice, such as the use
of chemical weapons or the treatment of prisoners. These
treaties can be changed or added to (such as when nations
change their position on the use of nuclear weapons), but this
again requires concerted political and diplomatic effort. So the
bodies responsible for understanding the effects of cognitive
enhancement on society are those that represent the moral
character of that society. Depending on the society, that may
be the democratic representatives of the population, or the
religious leaders, or senior legal experts, or non-governmental
organizations that press for change. These bodies need input
from researchers and primary users, and take direction from
philosophers and legal scholars.
CONCLUSIONS
In this review article I have attempted to set out a framework
for assessing the harms arising from a particular enhancement
intervention, and for identifying the interested parties whose
expertise may be required in judging the relative acceptability of
the enhancer given all the available information. For example,
a neuroscientist considering using tDCS to enhance a cohort
of undergraduates’ ability to memorise strings of numbers may
need to know about the side-effects of tDCS, but may not be
overly concerned with the potential use of tDCS in manipulating
political beliefs. Conversely, a government’s defense minister will
need to understand the societal implications of authorizing the
use of tDCS to extract information from a battlefield prisoner,
but may be less concerned with the risk of skin lesions in that
prisoner.
This is not to suggest that a politician need be ignorant of
the side-effects, nor that a scientist should close her ears to
issues of military uses of enhancement technology. However
the level at which a person considers the issues surrounding
enhancement technologies is generally limited. The three-level
taxonomy of harms that I propose here, of biological, ethical and
societal harms, will help in guiding the discussion of cognitive
enhancement for a particular enhancer or a particular use.
I have not dealt here with the issue of who, precisely, is
best placed to make decisions around the use of cognitive
enhancement in a given situation. There are many domains, such
as professional sports, where there are many layers of regulatory
oversight, and many different demands and obligations on the
person taking the enhancer. For example, a drug may be banned
by criminal law in an athlete’s home country but not the country
of competition, or the athlete may have signed a civil contract
with a sponsor not to take that drug, or the sport’s governing
body may allow a drug in some circumstances but not others.
Navigating overlapping systems is always a fraught process
(Black, 2008; Yeung and Dixon-Woods, 2010). However if we
are clear about the types of harms that may be encountered in
cognitive enhancement, we can at least help these competing
regimes to determine where they fit in the regulatory geography.
Good policy decisions in biomedicine can only arise through
an interaction among legal experts, ethicists and scientists, with
the goals of bringing greater reflective practice to ethically
significant science, and of grounding speculative reasoning in
scientific possibility (Maslen, 2015). I would also emphasize the
need to engage stakeholders at all levels of this debate, including
the end-users of the enhancement products (Davis, 2016), to
understand each person’s expectations and responsibilities, and
at the same time offering advice to users about potential risks and
harms. In particular, I argue that greater and more thoughtful
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prominence must be given to the harms associated with each
possible means of enhancement. Using a taxonomy such as the
three-part system outlined here gives a structure to this debate,
and clarifies the level of engagement of parties that take an
interest in how cognitive enhancement is used. There is no doubt
that drug- or device-based cognitive enhancement will increase
in usage and in ingenuity. It is of benefit to all that all parties
discuss the risks as well as the benefits of these methods.
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